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II. STATEMENT OF THE COURTS9 JURISDICTION
This is an appeal filed by the Plaintiff David Winters from a decision of the Third
District Court granting Summary Judgment for the Defendant/Appellee and denying the
Plaintiffs motion for Partial Summary Judgment. This appeal is being brought pursuant to
Rule 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Jurisdiction is further based upon Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §78-2-2
which grants the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over appeals from judgments of any
court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
This appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeals by order of the Supreme Court dated the
4th day of September, 1998.
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

The Issues Presented on Appeal
1.

Was the Notice of Lis Pendens prepared by the Defendant Abizaid's attorney

(i.e. the Defendant Joanne Schulman) and which was thereafter recorded in May of 1995
with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, used as an illegal means of asserting payment
on an unsecured and disputed money obligation arising out the 1989 California Decree of
Divorce?
2.

Did the recording of the Notice of Lis Pendens and the subsequent failure to

release the document under the core facts of the case constitute as a matter of law a violation
of a UCA §38-9-1 et. seq. as such law was in effect during the calendar year 1995?

3.

Did the District Court commit an error as a matter of law in ruling that the

claims of the Plaintiff set forth in UCA §38-9-1 et. seq. were moot?
4.

Did the District Court commit an error as a matter of law in ruling that there

was no duty of care running from the Defendant Joanne Schulman to the Plaintiff David
Winters as plead in Count III of the Complaint?
5.

Does the filing of the Notice of Lis Pendens as part of an attempt to collect on

a unsecured creditor's claim arising out of a foreign Decree of Divorce constitute a prima
facie case of abuse of legal process under the Utah common law and as plead in Count II of
the Complaint?
6.

Should the District Court have granted the Plaintiffs Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment as to the statutory liability under UCA §3 8-9-1 et. seq. pursuant to Count
I of the Complaint?
7.

Can the separate defenses of "privilege" and "mootness" be raised for the first

time in a motion for summary judgment?
8.

Assuming that the defense of privilege is plead properly, are there disputed

questions of a material fact with respect to the Defendant's claim to the privilege such that
it cannot be determined on a motion for summary judgment?
B.

The Standard of Review on Appeal as to All Issues
On review of the granting of summary judgment, the party against whom the

judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all inferences fairly
arising therefrom, considered by the reviewing court in the light most favorable to him.
-2-

Morris v. Famsworth Motel 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (Utah 1953); A. Wavne Winegar
v. Froerer Corp. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). Because summary judgment is granted as a
matter of law and only if the person is otherwise entitled to the relief sought, the Appellate
Court is free to review de novo the trial court's legal conclusions and rulings. Tim Themv
v. Seagull Enterprises. Inc. 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979); FrankM. Barbery. Farmers Ins. Exch.
751 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1988); A. Wavne Winegar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah
1991). The Court should review the District Court's rulings as to the law under the
"correction of error" standard. TRF v. Rav Felan 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1988); R. Owen
Neerings v. Utah State Bar 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 1991).
Summary judgment cannot be granted to a party where it involves a question of fact
and where there is a dispute as to any material facts. John C. Briggs v. Steven Holcomb 740
P.2d281 (UtahApp. 1987): Wanda Sandberg v. Robert D. Klein 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978).
IV. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Statutory Provisions:
1.

UCA §3 8-9-1, Liability of Person Filing Wrongful Lien.
A person who claims an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against, real
property, who causes or has caused a document asserting that claim to be recorded or
filed in the office of the county recorder, who knows or has reason to know that the
document is forged, groundless, or contains a material misstatement of false claim,
is liable to the owner or title-holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages,
whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees, and costs as provided in this
chapter, if he willfully refuses to release or correct such document of record within
20 days from the date of written request from the owner or beneficial title-holder of
the real property. This chapter is not intended to be applicable to mechanics' or
materialmen's liens.
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UCA §38-9-2, Claim of Lien not Authorized is Invalid.
A document purporting to claim an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance
against, real property not authorized by statute, judgment, or other specific legal
authority is presumed to be groundless and invalid.
UCA §38-9-3, Liability of Person Refusing to Correct Document Containing
Wrongful Lien - Penalty - Misdemeanor.
A person described in Section 38-9-1, who willfully refuses to release or
correct the document of record within 20 days from the date of written request from
the owner or beneficial title-holder of the real property:
(1) is liable to the owner or beneficial title-holder of the real property for the
sum of not less than $1,000, or for treble the actual damages caused by the
recording or filing, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and
costs of the action; and [Balance of statute outlined]
UCA §38-9-4, Action may be Brought in District Court - Costs and Attorneys
Fees.
The owner or beneficial title-holder of the real property may bring an action
under this chapter in the district court of the county in which the real property is
located for such relief as is required to immediately clear title to the real property or
may join that action with an action for damages as described in this chapter, after
giving the notice required in Section 38-9-1. In either case, the owner or beneficial
title-holder may recover reasonable attorney fees and costs of the action if he prevails.
UCA §78-13-1, Venue Statute.
Actions for the allowing causes must be tried in the county in which the subject
of the action, or some part thereof, is situated, subject to the power of the court to
change the place of trial as provided in this code:
(1) For the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, or for
the determination in any form of such right or interest, and for injuries to real
property.
(2) For the partition of real property. [Balance of the statute ommitted]
UCA §78-27-42, Release to one Defendant does not discharge other Defendants.
-4-

A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does
not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides.
7.

UCA §78-40-2, Lis Pendens (1951, as amended).
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property
the plaintiff at the time of filing the Complaint or thereafter, and the defendant at the
time of filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any
time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the county in which the
property or some part thereof is situated a notice of the pendency of the action,
containing the names of the parties, the object of the action or defense, and a
description of the property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing
such notice for record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected
thereby be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only
its pendency against parties designated by their real names.

8.

UCA §68-3-1, Utah Common Law Statute.
The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, or in conflict with,
the constitution or laws of the United States, or the constitution or law of the state,
and so far only as it is consistent with and adapted to the natural and physical
conditions of this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is hereby adopted, and
shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

The Nature of the Case.
This case is about a dispute over the amount of money claimed to be due under the

terms of a 1989 California Decree of Divorce. This was an action filed by the Plaintiff
against his ex-wife and her divorce lawyer in order to remove a cloud on the legal title to his
home. The chain of title was clouded as the result of the recording of a Notice of Lis
Pendens in May of 1995. The Lis Pendens was prepared by the Attorney Defendant. The
attorney recorded the Lis Pendens as part of her efforts to collect the money that may have
been due her client, Ms. Abizaid.
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The complaint was prepared in three (3) separate counts to wit: (i) quite title, (ii)
abuse of process, and (iii) negligence. The quite title allegations included the statutory cause
of action under Title 38.
B.

The Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below.
The Plaintiff filed the present civil suit on December 7, 1995, in order to compel the

cancellation of the recorded Notice of Lis Pendens.
On the 23rd day of April, 1996, the Plaintiff filed a motion to compel the release of the
Lis Pendens and to impose liability under UC A §3 8-9-1. On December 1,1997, the Plaintiff
filed amended affidavits and proceeded forward on the previously filed motion for partial
summary judgment against Ms. Schulman seeking liability under UCA §38-9-1 et. seq. The
relief was requested under Rules 12, 55, and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On
January 9, 1998, the Defendant Schulman filed a combined motion in opposition to the
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment and a cross-motion for summary judgment
dismissing the Plaintiffs complaint as to all cause of actions.
On April 1,1998, Judge William A. Thorne granted the Defendant Schulman's crossmotion for summary judgment and denied the Plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment against the Defendant as to any liability under §38-9-1 et. seq. The Plaintiff did
not file any motion with respect to Counts II and III of his Complaint.
The time delay between April of 1996 and December 1st, 1997 was the result of the
institution of similar proceedings before the California Superior Court which also sought the
release of the Lis Pendens. (Addendum No. 24 at page 191). There was also a debate
-6-

between the parties as to what was "settled" by the Superior Court. This ongoing dispute is
why the Third District Court ordered the Plaintiff to provide to the court a transcript of the
settlement proceedings.
The Plaintiff filed this appeal on April 24, 1998. (Addendum No. 23 at page 186).
C.

Statement of the Core Facts.
For purpose of the present action, the following core facts are to be taken as true and

in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff.
1.

Prior to 1989, the Plaintiff, David Winters, and the Defendant, Allison Abizaid,

were a married couple residing together as man and wife in the state of California. The
Plaintiff and the Defendant owned a certain piece of real property in Salt Lake County, state
of Utah which is not the subject matter of this proceeding. This other real property is one of
the reasons there is a dispute over a liability for various expenses arising under the terms of
the 1989 California Decree of Divorce. (Winters' Aff. 1}5). (Addendum No. 11 at page 49).
2.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant, Allison Abizaid, were eventually divorced in

the state of California on or about the 8th day of May, 1989. The foreign Decree of Divorce
awarded the Plaintiff (David Winters) certain real property located in the state of California
and awarded Allison Abizaid (a/k/a Allison Winters) certain real property located in the state
of Utah. By means of an oral agreement between the parties (and for their mutual
convenience), the Plaintiff traded the financial responsibility for the real property he owned
in the state of California to Allison Abizaid (a/k/a Allison Winters) in exchange for assuming
the financial responsibility for the real property that she owned in the state of Utah.
-7-

(Winters' Aff f 6). (Addendum No. 11 at page 49).
3.

As part of the agreement to trade responsibility for the property, the wife

agreed to assume and maintain a single family dwelling located at 51 El Molino Drive,
Clayton, California. This was the real property that was originally awarded to David Winters
in the 1989 California Decree of Divorce. (Winters' Aff.f7). (AddendumNo.7atpage27).
4.

The husband agreed to accept the financial responsibility for his former

spouse's rental unit located in Salt Lake County and which is located at 3088 East Nordic
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84093. This piece of real property was originally awarded to
Allison Abizaid in the 1989 California Decree of Divorce. (Winters' Aff. ^}8). (Addendum
No. 7 at page 27).
5.

Both the California real property (i.e. the home) and the Utah real property (i.e.

the rental unit) have been sold or otherwise disposed of by the parties as contemplated by the
divorce. The wife received aU of the sale proceeds from the California property (i.e. David
Winters' asset) and she also received one-half (Yi) of the sale proceeds of the Utah rental
property. (Winters' Aff. f9).
6.

The California Decree of Divorce contemplated the sale of these two (2) pieces

of real property. (Addendum No.7 at page 28).
7.

The home which is the subject matter of the present litigation was purchased

in July of 1990. The purchase occurred after the date the parties were legally divorced by
the California Superior Court. (Winter' Aff. ^ 10). (Addendum No. 11 at page 50).
8.

The parties have not remarried nor have they lived together as man and wife
-8-

since the date of the entry of the 1989 California Divorce Decree. (Winters' Aff^fll).
(Addendum No. 11 at page 50).
9.

The home located at 8948 South Cobblecrest Lane (which is the real property

now before the Court) was originally titled in the name of both David Winters and Allison
Winters (Abizaid). However, title to the home was later conveyed by Quit Claim Deed from
Allison Winters to the Plaintiff. The deed is dated December 10, 1992 and was duly
recorded by the Plaintiff. The present home is not marital property nor is it community
property of the parties. (Winters' Aff. ^f 12; Plaintiffs Exhibit 4). (Addendum No. 11 at page
50).
10.

On or about April 19, 1996, the Superior Court in California decreed that the

Lis Pendens was to be removed from the Respondent's separate property in Utah. (Schulman
Aff. Exhibit "G"; Plaintiffs Exhibit 4). (Addendum No. 16 and 17 at pages 90 and 91).
11.

The Ms. Schulman was the attorney of record for the wife in the California

divorce proceedings from May 5, 1995, to January 10, 1996. (Schulman Aff. Tf2).
(Addendum No. 21 at page 106).
12.

The Defendant Joanne Schulman prepared and filed all of the pleadings on

behalf of her client in which she was asserting a money claim in excess of $62,000.00.
(Schulman Aff. ffl| 3 to 6 and Exhibit "A"; Abizaid Aff. % 12). (Addendum No. 8 at page 32).
13.

In an attempt to collect various amounts of money allegedly owed by the

Plaintiff to his former spouse under the terms of the 1989 California Decree of Divorce, the
Attorney Defendant Joanne Schulman prepared and caused to be recorded a Lis Pendens
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dated May 18, 1995, with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. The Lis Pendens was
recorded on or about the 30th day of May, 1995 as entry No. 6090065, in book 7159, and at
page 694, of the official records of the county office. The Lis Pendens was recorded on the
very same home that Allison Abizaid (Winters) by deed, quit claimed any interest she had
to the Plaintiff in December of 1992. The signature of the Defendant, Allison Abizaid, is
affixed to the Notice of Lis Pendens. (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1; Winters' Aff. 1J13).
(Addendum No. 2 at page 18).
14.

By means of various letters to the Defendant's attorney, Joanne Schulman,

each Defendant was advised that the Lis Pendens was not proper and each of the Defendants
were asked to release the Lis Pendens. (Winters' Aff. 1fl[l4, 30, and 31; Plaintiffs Exhibits
2 and 3).
15.

The Defendant Joanne Schulman was put on actual notice that the Lis Pendens

would cause the Plaintiff economic injury, significant legal fees, and emotional distress if the
Lis Pendens was not released property. (Winters' Aff. Tfl5; Plaintiffs Exhibits 2 and 3).
16.

The Defendant Joanne Schulman was put on actual notice that the Plaintiff

would prosecute a civil case in the state courts if the Lis Pendens was not released. (Winters'
Aff. TJ16; Plaintiffs Exhibits 2 and 3).
17.

The Defendants, either jointly or severally, have never disclosed in writing to

the Plaintiff (or his attorney of record, W. Kevin Jackson) of any right of possession or legal
title any person may have to the property and none presently exists in the Defendants.
(Winters' Aff. ^f 17; Answer of Schulman 1J38). (Addendum No. 8 at page 32).
-10-

18.

The Defendants, jointly and severally, do not have a beneficial interest in the

legal title to the real property. (Winters Aff. ^f 18; Answer of Schulman ^38, Schulman Aff.
f6; Abizaid Aff.fflf9to 11).
19.

The action of the Defendant Joanne Schulman, in the filing of the Lis Pendens,

was intended to assert an unsecured and disputed debt obligation against the Plaintiff arising
under the terms of the California Decree of Divorce due in part to the agreement to trade
financial responsibility (but not legal title) for the former Utah and California properties.
The debt obligation was eventually asserted in the divorce courts in the state of California
and was the subject of various hearings in April and May of 1996. (Winters' Aff. ^|19;
Abizaid Aff.ffl[9to 11). (Addendum No. 16 to 18 beginning at page 90 to 93).
20.

The domestic dispute concerning the parties' obligations was eventually settled

at a hearing conducted in California on May 31, 1996. The results of the hearing required
the Lis Pendens to be released and the personal restraining order previously entered against
the Plaintiff was lifted. (Winters' Aff. Tfi|37 to 38). (Addendum No. 20 at page 101).
21.

The Defendants never filed any type of a civil case, either in the Superior Court

of California or in the state of Utah, which seeks to adjudicate the title to the property or the
right to the physical possession of the home. (Winters' Aff. ^[20; Schulman Aff. Exhibit "A";
Schulman Aff. T|3 to 5; Abizaid Aff. 1J13). (Addendum No. 8 at page 32).
22.

The substance of the claim made by Ms. Abizaid was a creditor's claim under

the "original" Decree of Divorce. (Schulman Aff. 1J3 to 5; Abizaid Aff. fflf9 to 10).
(Addendum No. 8 page 30 to 32).
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23.

In 1995, there was never any signed order of any court, either in the state of

California or the state of Utah, wherein the Defendant, Allison Abizaid, could make a claim
against the legal title to the Plaintiffs real property, which is situated in the state of Utah.
The home was acquired after the date of the termination of the marriage by the entry of the
1989 Decree of Divorce. The Defendant executed a Quit Claim Deed to the property dated
December 10th' 1992. (Winters' Aff. ^[21; Plaintiffs Exhibit 4).
24.

The Defendant, Joanne Schulman, knew, or reasonably should have known,

that it is improper and illegal to cloud the title to the real property located in the state of Utah
unless the person or party making the claim has a specific claim to or asserted a beneficial
interest in the subject property. (Winters' Aff. f22; Plaintiffs Exhibits 2 and 3).
25.

In 1995, the Defendants did not have any legal grounds and did not have

sufficient facts for the issuance of a prejudgment writ of attachment pursuant to Rule 64A
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and no such relief has ever been asserted in this civil
case. (Winters' Aff. ^[23; Answer of Schulman TJ30).
26.

The acts committed by the Defendants were directed towards the Plaintiff and

were committed with actual malice and with the specific intent of causing financial harm to
the Plaintiff by compelling him to pay a disputed debt. (Winters; Aff. ^|24; Plaintiffs Exhibit
4; Abizaid Aff. 1J13). (Addendum No. 15 at pages 85 to 89).
27.

The clouded chain of title to the real property did not allow the Plaintiff to

either sell the property or to use the property to obtain funds necessary to conduct his
ongoing business enterprises and has resulted in threats of civil litigation against the Plaintiff
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on account of his failure to provide these funds. (Winters' Aff. ^25).
28.

It was the specific intent of Ms. Schulman and Allison Abizaid to cloud the

title to the home to prevent any sale or liening of the asset. (Abizaid Aff. TJ12).
29.

The Defendant, Allison Abizaid, did not have any beneficial interest in the real

property in 1995 and surrendered any such right in December of 1992 when a Quit Claim
Deed was given to the Plaintiff. (Winters' Aff. Tf26; Plaintiffs Exhibit 4; Schulman Aff. P ) .
3 0.

The Defendants filed the Lis Pendens with the intent ofpreventing the Plaintiff,

David Winters, from selling the real property and as a means of collecting a disputed
unsecured debt without compliance with Rule 64A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Winters' Aff. 1J27; Schulman Aff.ffi[4to 6).
31.

The Plaintiff, David Winters, has been damaged by not being able to exercise

his vested rights of ownership to the real property and is now suffering and continues to
suffer mental anguish and distress on account of the illegal conduct of the Defendants.
(Winters' Aff. ^{29; Plaintiffs Exhibits 2, 3, and 5).
32.

On or about the 5th and 17th day of October, 1995, the Plaintiff made a written

request in the form of a letter addressed to the California attorney, Joanne Schulman, that the
Defendants remove the Lis Pendens from the property. The Defendants refused to do so
within the twenty (20) day time period set forth in UCA §38-9-3. (Winters' Aff. TJ30;
Plaintiffs Exhibits 2 and 3).
33.

On March 29, 1996 (nearly four (4) months after the suit was filed), the

Plaintiff, by means of a letter to the attorneys for each named Defendant, for the third time
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requested the immediate release of the Lis Pendens. (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 5; Winters' Aff.
131).
34.

The Plaintiff has also made a claim for reasonable attorney's fees and the costs

that he has incurred by having to prosecute this matter against the Defendants. (Winters'
Aff. ffi[32 and 35). (Addendum No. 11 at pages 53 to 54).
3 5.

The Defendant, Joanne Schulman, is an attorney licensed to practice law in the

state of California. Ms. Schulman (as a licensed attorney) owed a duty to the Plaintiff to
properly investigate the facts of a case and to research the appropriate law in the state in
which she is attempting to practice law or in the state that she files any Notice of Lis
Pendens. (Winters' Aff. Tf33; Plaintiffs Exhibit 3). (Addendum No. 3 at pages 21 to 22).
36.

By filing an improper Notice of Lis Pendens, the Defendant Joanne Schulman

has abused the judicial process of the state of Utah and the legal processes of the Salt Lake
County Recorder's Office, which are used to properly track legal and beneficial title to real
property located in Salt Lake County, state of Utah. The Defendants have not complied with
the provisions of UCA §78-40-1 et.seq. as it relates to the Lis Pendens. (Winters' Aff. If34).
37.

When the Lis Pendens was finally released, a copy of the same was never

delivered to the Plaintiff, David Winters, either personally or by mail. (Winters' Aff. p 6 ) .
38.

The domestic dispute between David Winters and Allison Abizaid, was

eventually settled during a hearing before the California Superior Court. The settlement
hearing was held on May 31, 1996. As part of the settlement, the personal restraining order
against the Plaintiff was lifted. (Winters' Aff. ^|37). (Addendum No. 20 at pages 97 to 104).
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39.

The compromise agreement resulted in a voluntarily imposed Trust Deed on

the real property that the Plaintiff could pay off early without any penalty. The obligation
did not accrue any interest. (Winters' Aff. f38). (Addendum No. 20 at pages 97 to 104).
40.

The settlement agreement released Allison Abizaid from any further liability

in this case, but did not release the Defendant Joanne Schulman. (Winters' Aff. 1J38).
(Addendum No. 20 at page 100).
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A.

The Plaintiffs Complaint, and supported by his affidavits, sets forth a prima

facie case of: (i) liability under UCA §38-9-1 et. seq., (ii) the tort of abuse of process, and
(iii) negligence.
B.

The core facts on which liability attaches under UCA §38-9-1 et. seq. is not

subject to the defense of flmootnessM once the twenty (20) day time period has expired.
C.

The conduct of the attorney, after having been put on actual notice of the claim

over a long period of time, is not protected by a claim of privilege.
D.

The use of a Lis Pendens under the facts of this case is an illegal means to

compel payment of a debt.
E.

The Defendant Joanne Schulman has not raised or plead the defense of

privilege in her answer and she has now waived such a defense.
F.

Even if the defense of privilege is properly plead, there are questions of intent

and proper purpose such that the defense cannot be asserted for the first time when a motion
for summary judgment is filed.
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G.

The defense of "mootness" and "privilege" cannot be raised for the first time

in a motion for summary judgement and where such defenses were not included in the
Answer.
VII. ARGUMENT
A.

Was the Filing of the California Notice of Lis Pendens by the Defendant Joanne
Schulman, Improper Under Utah Law as in Effect During 1995?
The filing of the Notice of Lis Pendens as prepared by the attorney Defendant Joanne

Schulman which asserts the authority of the California Superior Court over property in a
foreign state was improper. The filing of the Notice of Lis Pendens by the Defendant
Schulman was improper for three (3) reasons: First, the use of a Lis Pendens is authorized
only in any action "affecting title to, or the right of possession of, real property...." UCA
§78-40-2. At the time the notice was recorded, there was no civil action filed by either
Defendant that was intended to affect the legal title or the right to the physical possession of
the real property in Utah. (Schulman Aff. Exhibit "A"). (Addendum No. 8 at page 30). Ms.
Abizaid, in her own affidavit, has never asserted such a claim, but rather has only asserted
creditor claims. (Abizaid Aff ^ 9 to 11). Second, any civil action affecting title to real
property must be filed in the county in which the property is physically situated. The
Defendants failed to file any civil action or, as an alternative, failed to institute a proceeding
under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act concerning the real property. Ms. Schulman admitted,
in her answer, that no civil suit was ever filed in the state of Utah. (Schulman Ans. 1J53).
Third, a Lis Pendens is a constructive republication of the pleadings and must be filed after
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the civil action involving the real property has been commenced. The "publication" of the
civil suit that does not yet exist is a legal nullity. The filing of the Notice of Lis Pendens
was, as acknowledged by the Defendant Joanne Schuman, done in "anticipation" of an action
to determine a sum of money allegedly owed under the 1989 California Decree of Divorce.
(Schulman's Aff. ^6). No civil action of any type was ever filed in the State of Utah by the
Defendants. (Schulman Ans. 1J53). The California enforcement motion was filed months
after the Notice of Lis Pendens was recorded. (Addendum No. 8 at page 30). By Ms.
Schulman's own admission, the proceeding in California was not filed until October 20,
1995. (Schulman's Aff. TJ4).
The recording of a Notice of Lis Pendens under these circumstances is not in
accordance with Utah law. It is not authorized to be used in this manner and therefore such
an act cannot then be privileged.
1.

A Lis Pendens Filing is authorized in Utah Where a Specific Claim is Made
Against Specific Property.

The legal term "Lis Pendens" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary Revised Forth
Edition as follows:
A pending suit; . . . jurisdiction, power, or control which courts acquire over
property in suit pending action and until final judgment. [Emphasis Added]
The legal term "Notice of Lis Pendens" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary Revised
Forth Edition as follows:
A notice filed for the purpose of warning all persons that the title to certain
property is in litigation, and that, if they purchase the defendant's claim to the
same, they are in danger of being bound by an adverse judgment. [Emphasis
-17-

Added]
The Utah Code in 1995 authorized the use of a Lis Pendens as part of a legal
proceeding to quite title to real property. The filing of a Lis Pendens is specifically
authorized by the provisions of UCA §78-40-1 et. seq. This statute is the recognized legal
means of publicly asserting an adverse claim to a specific piece of real property. The statute
does not allow a person to merely cloud the title to the property and then do nothing. Max
E. Birch v. Forrest W. Fuller 9 Ut.2d 79, 337 P.2d 964 (Utah 1959). The Defendant Joanne
Schulman, in her own affidavit, admits that no proceeding of any type was commenced in
California until October 20,1995. (Schulman Aff.T|4). The Notice of Lis Pendens was filed
on May 18, 1995. (Plaintiff s Exhibit 1). (Addendum No. 2 at page 18).
UCA §78-40-2 authorizes the filing of a Notice of Lis Pendens as part of any civil
action, "affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property. . .". The Lis
Pendens is allowed to be filed only where it is part of an ongoing civil suit respecting the real
property and provided the claimant in the civil suit seeks relief as to: (i) title to the property,
or (ii) at least possession of the property. James Busch v. James Doyle 141 BR 432 (DC
Utah 1992). It is not to be used to cloud the chain of title in hopes of obtaining a legal
advantage over another regardless of the merit of the claim being asserted. John P. Doritv
v.JeanD.Doritv 645 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982); Marvin W. Hansen v. Reuel S. Kohler 550 P.2d
186(1976).
In the Busch case, the Federal District Court of Utah found the filing of a Lis Pendens
was improper. The Plaintiff in the Busch case sued to recover a sum of money owed to him
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by the Defendant and to force the payment of a percentage of the proceeds from the sale of
the real property in question. The claimant did not make a claim to any title or the physical
possession of the asset. The Federal District Court held that the Complaint, in substance,
sought only monetary damages. Busch at page 436. The court thus stated, "A claim for a
share of the proceeds from the sale of land, when and if the land is sold, does not affect the
title to nor the right of possession of the land." Id.
The present case and the Busch case are the same. The Defendants in this case were
asserting only monetary claims and not a claim to title or any right to the physical possession
of the real property. (Schulman Aff. Exhibit "A", listing the specific relief being sought and
not listing any claim to title or physical possession of the home; Abizaid Aff. ffl|9 to 11).
(Addendum No. 8 at page 32). The Notice of Lis Pendens claims that the Defendant Allison
Abizaid was asserting a community property law interest in the real property and that such
affected the title. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1). The California enforcement motion that was
eventually filed never made such a claim. (Addendum No. 8 at page 32). In addition, the
problem with the assertion is that the divorce was finalized on May 8,1989. (Schulman Aff.
Exhibit" A"). (Addendum No. 7 at page 27). The parties are single. The property described
in the Notice of Lis Pendens was purchased in July of 1990. While it may be true that the
down payment for the property was made with funds from the sale of the community
property or perhaps even a loan on community assets, the Defendant Allison Abizaid
terminated any interest she had in the asset when she signed the Quit Claim Deed to the
property in 1992. The Quit Claim Deed (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4) is clear on its face and its not
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subject to any parol evidence to the contrary. In her own Affidavit, Ms. Schulman admits
that the only relief that was sought in the Superior Court proceedings was for a sum of
money due under the 1989 Decree of Divorce in excess of $62,000.00. (Schulman Aff. ^[3;
Exhibit "A"). (Addendum No. 8 at page 32 and No. 20 at page 135).
Even assuming that the Quit Claim Deed was given to the Plaintiff, David Winters,
by the Defendant, Allison Abizaid, allegedly in exchange for an express promise to pay a
sum of money due under the terms of the Decree of Divorce, this act is nothing more than
an unsecured promise to pay a sum of money in the future. (Abizaid Aff. Tfl[6 to 9; Schulman
Aff. TJ3). In order to assert any claim to the title to the home after the execution and delivery
of the Quit Claim Deed, she would have to sue for a cancellation of the Quit Claim Deed or
to rescind the deed based on some claim of fraud or duress. These types of claims were
never asserted. (Schulman Aff. Exhibit "A", listing the specified relief being sought in the
enforcement motion). (Addendum No. 8 at page 32).
The California enforcement motion also requested an order restraining the Plaintiff
from borrowing against or disposing of the property until he had fully paid any money that
the court may ultimately find that he owed under the 1989 Decree of Divorce. (Schulman
Aff. %5). The motion did not seek legal or beneficial title to the property or the physical
possession of the property. The motion sought the payment of an unadjudicated sum of
money, allegedly owed to Ms. Abizaid. The Defendant asked the court for some form of lien
protection in order to secure the payment of the money. This type of relief was contested by
the Plaintiff and it was never granted by the Superior Court. (Addendum No.8 at page 32
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and No. 25 at page 201). The enforcement motion is not an action in which a person can file
a Lis Pendens under UCA §78-40-2 or even under California law.
The Plaintiffs former spouse, in her sworn affidavit, conceded the following facts:
A.

Ms. Abizaid claimed a sum due her under the Decree of Divorce. (Abizaid
Aff. f 9).

B.

Ms. Abizaid acknowledged an ongoing money dispute that lasted at least two
(2) years and was based on the original Decree of Divorce. (Abizaid Aff. If 10).

C.

Ms. Abizaid made numerous attempts to collect the money that she claimed
was due her under the terms of the Decree of Divorce. (Abizaid Aff. ^[11).

D.

Ms. Abizaid eventually filed a motion to enforce the terms of the Decree of
Divorce. (Abizaid Aff. 1J13).

E.

The California Superior Court ordered the immediate release of the Notice of
Lis Pendens. (Abizaid Aff. 1fl9). (Addendum No. 13).

The California courts have long realized that a Lis Pendens can be a powerful weapon
to extort benefits or to gain a legal advantage. These are the old problems of "distraint" and
"replevin" in a divorce setting which raise substantial constitutional issues.
Ms. Schulman has stated (as an officer of the Superior Court) that the claim of Allison
Abizaid under the Decree of Divorce is a creditor's claim.

Ms. Schulman fully

acknowledged to the court that the only legal remedy the wife had under the 1989 Decree of
Divorce was for a money judgment. (Addendum No. 15 at page 86). The exact words of the
attorney are as follows:
"In this case, Petitioner has no other remedy available. Her attempts to
negotiate (sic) and settle with Respondent for the last 3 years have failed."
This statement of the lawyer is preceded by the heading in her legal memorandum that
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is styled "Money Judgment is the Appropriate Remedy." (Addendum No. 15 at page 86).
Ms. Schulman, prepared and filed the Lis Pendens notwithstanding this basic knowledge of
the nature of the claim. (Addendum No. 21 at page 135). The course of conduct by the
attorney is improper and is an illegal means of collecting on an unsecured debt of any type.
The California Superior Court did not sanction the use of the Lis Pendens. (Schulman
Aff. Exhibit "G" and "H"). (Addendum No. 16 to 18 at pages 190 to 194 ). The attorney
knew or should have known that the use of the Lis Pendens in the manner employed in this
case was illegal under both Utah and California law. This course of conduct is not evidence
of good faith. The Defendant claims that her conduct as a lawyer is absolutely privileged.
There are a very few absolute privileges in the law. This case is not one of those situations.
Max E. Birch v. Forrest W. Fuller 9 Ut.2d 79, 337 P.2d 964 (Utah 1959). Ms. Schulman
clearly understood the nature of the claim that she was asserting on behalf of her client.
(Addendum No. 21 at page 135). She prepared the original demand letter. She prepared all
of the pleadings and drafted and caused to be recorded the Notice of Lis Pendens.
In the California Superior Court pleadings entitled "Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Petitioner's (Wife's) Claims for Reimbursement, Sanctions, etc.", the issue of
the improper use of the Lis Pendens was addressed at pages 8 to 11. (Schulman Aff. Exhibit
"C"). (Addendum No. 25 at page 201). This memorandum was prepared by David Winter's
domestic law attorney. It addresses the illegality of the recording of a Lis Pendens. Under
California law, the recording of a Notice of Lis Pendens is illegal when it is used as leverage
to obtain an unfair bargaining position. Hilberg v. Superior Court 215 Cal.App.3d 539
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(1989). The abuse of this legal devise lead the Hilberg court to state the following:
"We cannot ignore as judges what we know as lawyers... that the recording
of a lis pendens is sometimes made not to prevent conveyances of property
that is the subject of the lawsuit, but to coerce an opponent to settle regardless
of the merits." [Emphasis Added.]
The Hilberg court notes that the use of the Lis Pendens is proper when there is a
specific claim asserted against a specific piece of property. The trial brief addressed the
following legal issues under California law. (Schulman Aff. Exhibit "C", pages 8-11).
(Addendum No. 25 at page 201).
a.

The use of a Lis Pendens is to be restricted to specific situations none of which
were applicable in the divorce action.

b.

That a Lis Pendens is often used as an abusive remedy and such abuse had
been acknowledged by the California courts.

c.

Where the claim is an unsecured debt, then a Lis Pendens is not available.

d.

Title to a specific possession of the property must be the central issue before
the court can sanction the use of a Lis Pendens.

e.

The fact that the underlying action has merit is not relevant to determine if
there has been an improper use of the Lis Pendens.

f.

Settlement coercion is not a proper use of the Lis Pendens.

g.

The recording of the Lis Pendens requires that the notice to be sent by certified
or registered mail to the parties of record in the chain of title and this act was
never done in the divorce case.

h.

Proof of service of the notice must be attached to the Lis Pendens and such
was not done in either case.

i.

The failure to follow procedures listed in the California Code renders the
notice legally deficient and defective.
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The attorney Defendant should have known that the use of a Lis Pendens to collect
an unsecured debt arising under an adjudicated 1989 Decree of Divorce is illegal under Utah
and California law.
2.

Utah Law Requires All Civil Actions Concerning Real Property to be Filed in
the County Where the Property is Located.

Utah Code §78-13-1 requires an action respecting any real property must be filed in
the county where the property is physically located. The Defendants never filed such an
action. (Schulman Ans. 1J53). The Utah Code reads as follows:
Actions for the following causes must be tried in the county in which the
subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated,...
(1)

For the recovery of real property or of an estate or
interest therein, or for the determination in any
form of such right or interest, and for injuries to
real property.

(2)

For the partition of real property. [Balance of statue omitted.]

The recording of a Notice of Lis Pendens, and then five (5) months thereafter, filing
a motion to enforce the Decree of Divorce in California in order to determine what amount
of money may be owed under it does not comply with UCA §78-13-1. There is no question
that the California Superior Court had jurisdiction over the parties and that the Superior
Court could issue restraining orders against any of the parties. The Superior Court did not
have nor could it have asserted jurisdiction over the Utah property since this asset was not
part ofthe original divorce action and, more importantly, it was not physically situated within
the boundaries of the state of California. The California Superior Court had personal
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jurisdiction over the parties, but not over the real property located in Utah.

No action

concerning the real property has been filed at any time by either Defendant in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah. (Schulman Ans. ^53). (Addendum No. 9 at page 40).
It is a basic premise of the law that no court can assert power or jurisdiction over
property located in another state. John P. Doritv v. Jean D. Doritv 645 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982);
Martha M. Barber v. Marion M. Barber 51 Cal.2d 244, 331 P.2d 628 (Cali. 1958). The
claimant must assert his legal right to real property in the courts where the property is
physically located. John P. Doritv v. Jean D. Doritv 645 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982). This is one
(1) reason why we have a federal constitution that provides for full faith and credit of sister
state decrees. The Utah Uniform Foreign Judgment Act is but one method by which this
enforcement can be accomplished.
3.

In Order to File a Lis Pendens in Utah, an Action Concerning the Specific
Property Must be Filed First.

Assuming that the "California Enforcement Motion" somehow asserted a claim to the
title or a right to the physical possession to the real property, the Notice of Lis Pendens
would still be improper in this case. The Utah Code requires the filing of the civil action
before the Notice of Lis Pendens is filed. A "hanging" Lis Pendens is not authorized and is
a cloud on the owner's chain of title. The statute authorizing the use of a Lis Pendens clearly
states "at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter,... [the claimant] may file for record
with the recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated a notice
of the pendency of the action...". UCA §78-40-2. This procedural requirement is important.

-25-

The law requires that the civil suit must be filed first. This is not a mere technicality. It is
necessary in order to afford the property owner some marginal form of due process of law
and prevents abuse of process.
In the present case, the Lis Pendens was filed more than five (5) months before the
alleged enforcement action was started in California on October 20, 1995. (Plaintiffs
Exhibit 1; Schulman Aff. ^|6). (Addendum No. 8 at page 30). By her own admission, the
Notice of Lis Pendens was filed in "anticipation" of filing an action to determine amounts
of money owed under the Decree of Divorce. (Schulman Aff. ^[6; Abizaid Aff. ffl|9 to 11).
The Lis Pendens refers to the original divorce action as the basis of the claim, but as noted,
the present real property was not part of that original divorce action. It was acquired after
the divorce was final. The parties were single. They were not cohabitating. They have not
remarried. Mr. Winters lives in Utah and Ms. Abizaid lives in California. The Defendant
Allison Abizaid executed a Quit Claim Deed to the asset in 1992. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4).
The California proceeding was nothing more than a motion to determine, and then enforce,
what may have been due the ex-wife under the original 1989 Decree of Divorce. (Schulman
Aff. Tf4; Abizaid Aff.ffi[9tol 1). (Addendum No. 8 at page 32).
The Defendant had to be prodded into filing the enforcement motion by the Plaintiffs
threats of litigation. (Plaintiff Exhibits 2 and 3). The Defendants intended to allow the Lis
Pendens to remain until such time as David Winters had an urgent need to access his equity
in the home.
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4.

Affirmative Defenses Must be Plead Specifically Under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Ms. Schulman has asserted various defenses to the complaint. Defenses to the
Complaint are required to be stated in the answer as required by Rules 7 through 9 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Defenses may not be raised in an affidavit, but must be
specifically set forth in the answer of the Defendant. Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Curtis
Wilken 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983).
The purpose of Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is to provide the parties
with adequate notice of the issues raised and the facts that support them, thereby giving the
other party an opportunity to fairly meet them. A. H. Cheny v. W. R. Rucker 14 Ut.2d 205,
381 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963).
As a general rule, a party asserting an affirmative defense has the burden of proving
specific facts sufficient to establish the defense. Tates, Inc v. Little Amer. Refining Co. 535
P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975); Sugarhouse Financial Co v. Eugene Anderson 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah
1980). These facts must be plead even if done in a skeleton fashion to begin with. The
answer of the Defendant Joanne Schulman merely list possible defenses without any
supporting facts. This vague list of defenses does not identify the defense of: (i) privilege,
or (ii) mootness.
An affirmative defense, if not properly raised in the pleadings, is deemed waived
under Rule 12(h) unless: (i) a motion to amend is made, (ii) the issue is actually tried as part
of the proceedings between the parties, or (iii) the Plaintiff is given notice and an opportunity
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to meet the specific claim or defense. E. Dee Olpin v. Grove Finance Co. 521 P.2d 1221
(Utah 1974); FMA Financial Corp. v. Build Inc. 17 Ut.2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (Utah 1965).
5.

The Filing of an Unauthorized Lis Pendens is not Protected From Civil
Liability by the Claim of a Privilege Under the Facts of this Case.

Because the filings of the Lis Pendens was unauthorized by any state statute, the claim
of a privilege to so act does not protect the Defendants from civil liability or, more
importantly, from any statutory liability that may be present.
The Restatement of Torts defines what type of a privilege the Defendant may assert
when she filed the Lis Pendens. The privilege is lost where the act is done for an improper
purpose. This issue of the attorney's proper intent is a factual matter and cannot be
determined on summary judgment when there is an opposing factual matter asserted.
(Winters' Aff. ffl[24, 27, and 29; Plaintiff Exhibits 2, 3, and 5).
Restatement, Torts, Section 638.
A party to a private litigation . . . has an absolute privilege to disparage
another's property in or the quality of his land, chattels, or intangible things in
the institution of or during the course and as a part of a judicial proceeding in
which he participates if the disparagement has some correlation thereto.
Comment C, Section 638, refers to the Comment of Section 587 which acknowledges
that a person may bring an action for the wrongful initiation of the proceedings if such were
initiated without probable cause or for an improper purpose. See also Marvin W. Hansen v.
ReuelS.Kohler550P.2d 186,190 (Utah 1976). The filing ofa Lis Pendens in this case was
for an improper purpose. It was an illegal means used to accomplish a just end. The end
never justifies the means.
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In the Hansen case, the Supreme Court of Utah ruled that a party does have a qualified
privilege to record a Notice of Lis Pendens when it is used in the proper manner and when
it is used to achieve a proper end. The Plaintiff, in the Hansen case, recorded a Lis Pendens
shortly after filing an action to rescind a conveyance of the property. The Defendant sold the
property to a third party before the Lis Pendens was recorded, but after the action had
commenced. The third party then filed a claim against the Plaintiff for disparagement of his
title. The court dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reasoned the " . . . the recordation
of a notice of lis pendens is, in effect, a republication of the pleadings." Hansen at page 190.
Thus, the court concluded that where the publication of the pleadings is a privileged event,
then the recording of a Notice of Lis Pendens is also a, privileged event. Id.
However, the court in the Hansen case, distinguished its holding from a situation
where the Lis Pendens is not filed in accordance with law. Id. The filing of the Notice of
Lis Pendens in this case is the distinguished example. The Lis Pendens was not filed in
accordance with the applicable law, nor were there any local actions pending that affected
the title or the right to the physical possession of the property. Even assuming the California
motion proceedings qualifies as a proper action, it was not commenced until five (5) months
after the filing of the Lis Pendens and after, the demand for its removal was made known,
but ignored. (Plaintiffs Exhibits 2 and 3). The notice was not sent by registered or certified
mailed to the Plaintiff as required by California law. The Lis Pendens fails to contain the
required mailing certificate. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 2). (Addendum No. 2 at page 18).
The Utah Supreme Court in the Hansen case has stated the rule of law as follows:
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The sole purpose of recording a notice of lis pendens is to give constructive
notice of the pendency of the proceeding; its only foundation is the action filed
- it has no existence independent of it. [Emphasis Added]
The Supreme Court of Utah has previously ruled that the use of a Lis Pendens, as
employed in the case at hand, is illegal. Max E. Birch v. Forrest W. Fuller 9 Ut.2d 79, 337
P.2d 964 (Utah 1959). The Defendants (the Fullers), in the Birch case, filed a Lis Pendens
stating that they owned or asserted a claim to the property. The Fullers did not have any
ownership in the property, nor did they ever file any action against Mr. Birch in which they
claimed ownership to the land. The only claim the Fullers made was for a sum of money.
The Supreme Court held that the filing of a Lis Pendens wrongful, and it also held that was
done in bad faith and with malice. Id.
The Federal Courts have also agreed that the use of a Lis Pendens in connection with
an action asserting a claim of money is improper. James Busch v. James Doyle 141 BR 436
(DC Utah 1992); Hamilton v. Smith 808 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1986).
The Defendant in the Busch case sought an order to release the Lis Pendens filed by
Mr. Busch to secure the payment of a percentage of the proceeds of the property. The federal
court held that the filing of the Lis Pendens was improper and that "Utah law does not allow
for the filing of Lis Pendens in cases seeking a money judgment." Busch at 436.
In the Hamilton case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance of an
injunction to prevent the filing of a Lis Pendens in connection with a Civil Rights claim. The
court held that since the Plaintiff had no claim to the title or to the physical possession of the
real property he could not legally file a Notice of Lis Pendens. The court reasoned that
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statutes similar to Utah's UCA §78-40-2 (1953) "have been construed to prohibit the filing
of a Notice of Lis Pendens in anticipation of a money judgment." Hamilton at 37.
Ms. Schulman knew or should have known she was not authorized to file a Notice of
Lis Pendens in Utah where the cause of action is for a sum of money. James Busch v. James
Dovle 141 BR 436 (DC Utah 1992); Hamilton v. Smith 808 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1986). No
civil suit was ever initiated (either in California or Utah) wherein Ms. Abizaid was seeking
title to the home or a right to its physical possession. (Schulman Aff. Exhibit "A"; Abizaid
Aff.ffi[9to 11; Schulman Ans. TJ53). (Addendum No. 8 at pages 30 to 32).
Under Utah law, the filing of a Notice of Lis Pendens is not a privileged act when the
actual relief being sought is a money judgment. The California enforcement motion filed
by the Defendant and used by her for the issuance of the Lis Pendens is nothing more than
a claim for a sum of money. (Schulman Aff. Exhibit "A"; Abizaid Aff ^ 9 to 11).
(Addendum No. 8 at page 32).

Although the Defendant Schulman claims that under

California law she is privileged to file a Notice of Lis Pendens on the property, California
law is not controlling. The filing of a Notice of Lis Pendens on property located in Utah is
governed under Utah law. The law requires that the action must be filed in the county where
the property is situated. John P. Doritv v. Jean D. Doritv 645 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982). If the
notice can be filed in another state or in another country, then there is no reasonable way a
potential purchaser can investigate the asserted claims and then decide for himself whether
or not to enter into a transaction involving the property.
The California Supreme Court has acknowledged that it is a common practice to take
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real property as a hostage in order to improve a persons bargaining position. This course of
conduct has been declared to be illegal where the suit is for a sum of money and not a
specific claim to the real property itself. Allied Easter Financial v. Goheen Enterprises 265
Cal.App.2d 131, 71 Cal.Rptr. 126 (Cali. App. 1968); Deane v. Superior Court of Orange
County 164 Cal.App.3d 292, 210 Cal.Rptr. 406 (Cali. App. 1985).
B.

Did the Filing of the Lis Pendens and the Failure to Release the Same Under the Core
Facts of the Case, Constitute as a Matter of Law, a Violation of UCA §38-9-1 et. seq.,
as such law was in effect during 1995?
The Notice of Lis Pendens was a wrongful claim document affecting real property and

the failure to release it subjects the parties to statutory liability. Once liability attaches, a
later release of the document does not "moot" the claim. The Utah Code prohibits the filing
of any type of claim or interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against real property that is either
false or groundless. UCA §38-9-1. The Utah Code also provides a statutory claim for
money damages to the injured party when a false claim over the real property is made and
not thereafter released. UCA §38-9-2. Ms. Schulman prepared and caused to be filed a
groundless Lis Pendens and she can and should be held accountable for this conduct under
the statute. She has acknowledged that she is the author of the document. (Schulman Aff.
^|6). She has also acknowledged that she was the principle reason the document was
recorded. (Schulman Aff. 1J4; Abizaid Aff. Tfl2).
UCA §38-9-1 provides that if any person claims an interest in real property and who
knows the claim is groundless or who files a false claim is liable to the owner of the property
for the statutory sum of $1,000.00 plus incurred attorney's fees. The statute provides that if
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actual damages exceed $1,000.00, then the special damages that are proven at the time of
trial are to be tripled.
The text of UCA §38-9-1 as it existed when the case was filed reads as follows:
A person who claims an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against, real
property, who causes or has caused a document asserting that claim to be
recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder, who knows or has reason
to know that the document is forged, groundless, or contains a material
misstatement or false claim, is liable to the owner or title-holder for $ 1,000 or
for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorneys
fees, and costs as provided in this chapter, if he willfully refuses to release or
correct such document of record within 20 days from the date of written
request from the owner or beneficial title-holder of the real property. This
chapter is not intended to be applicable to mechanics' or materialmen's liens.
[Emphasis Added]
The Lis Pendens prepared by the attorney andfiledby the Defendants is a "document"
and it clearly asserts a false legal claim regarding a pending divorce action and a division of
the asset under California marital property laws. Both Defendants knew that such an
assertion is wrong. It is certainly a "material misstatement." The California Decree of
Divorce was final in May of 1989.
A careful examination of the Lis Pendens will reveal how false the claim is and that
each Defendant knew it was false when the attorney presented the document for the client's
signature. No divorce action was "pending" in 1995 in which the California Superior Court
could conceivably divide the Utah property either directly or indirectly. John P. Dority v.
Jean D. Doritv 645 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982); Martha M. Barber v. Marion M. Barber 51 Cal.2d
244,331 P.2d 628 (Cali. 1958). A motion to enforce the Decree of Divorce was not pending
in the Superior Court. The real property was purchased after the Decree of Divorce was
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entered. Even assuming that it became "community property" because a portion of the
purchase price may have been financed, in part, with community funds, it lost such status
when it was conveyed to the Plaintiff in 1992. The Lis Pendens does not allege fraud or seek
a rescission of the deed. The motion to enforce the Decree of Divorce never sough this type
of relief. In contrast, the Notice of Lis Pendens asserts the claim of a pending divorce action
which is blatantly false and giving the old 1988 case number for this legal claim. The
Plaintiff admits that an enforcement motion was eventually filed by the wife to determine the
amount of money that may be due her under the 1989 Decree of Divorce. However, at no
time was any claim to the title of home made by the ex-wife. (Abizaid Aff. fflJ9 to 11).
(Addendum No. 8 at page 30). At the very least, the Notice of Lis Pendens materially
misstates the relief the wife was going to seek when and if she eventually brought such an
action.
The real dispute is over a debt arising under the 1989 Decree of Divorce and not a
right to the physical possession or ownership of title to the home. This basic fact is stated
in Ms. Schulman's first letter to the Plaintiff dated September 2, 1995. (Addendum No. 21
at page 135). The Lis Pendens was used as "muscle" to extort the payment of money from
the Plaintiff. Even if the Plaintiff owed his former spouse some money, the lawyer cannot
go about collecting it in an illegal manner. Martha M. Barber v. Marion M. Barber 51 Cal.2d
244, 331 P.2d 628 (Cali 1958). The collection actions and methods used by Joanne
Schulman are illegal under Utah and California law.
UCA §38-9-2 provides that a document purporting to be an interest in real property
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which is not authorized by law is presumed to be groundless and invalid. The text of the
statute reads as follows:
A document purporting to claim an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance
against, real property not authorized by statute, judgment, or other specific
legal authority is presumed to be groundless and invalid. [Emphasis Added]
There is no factual dispute that no action was pending in any court when the Lis
Pendens was recorded in May of 1995. The necessary procedural requirement of the filing
of a civil suit in order to justify the use of the recorded Lis Pendens was not present. Marvin
W. Hansen v. Reuel S. Kohler 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976). A "hanging" Lis Pendens is not
authorized to be used in civil litigation. Max E. Birch v. Forrest W. Fuller 9 Ut.2d 79, 337
P.2d 964 (Utah 1959). The Lis Pendens is to be used only when the suit is actually
commenced. This is statutorily mandated, it is sound public policy and preserves the
integrity of the land records.
UCA §38-9-3 provides that the statutory liability of $1,000.00 applies if a person
refuses to release or to correct the document within twenty (20) days of a written request.
The text of the statute reads as follows:
A person described in Section 38-9-1, who willfully refuses to release or
correct the document of record within 20 days from the date of written request
from the owner or beneficial title-holder of the real property:
(1) is liable to the owner or beneficial title-holder of the real
property for the sum of not less than $1,000, or for treble the
actual damages caused by the recording of filing, whichever is
greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs of the action;
and [Emphasis Added] [Balance of statute omitted]
There is no Utah legal authority allowing the filing of a Notice of Lis Pendens on real
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property where the real claim is nothing more than a disputed unsecured debt obligation.
Max E. Birch v. Forrest W. Fuller 9Ut.2d 79, 337 P.2d 964 (Utah 1959). The source of the
creditors' claim (be it a note, trade account, or a Decree of Divorce) is not sufficient to
warrant the use of a Lis Pendens. The Defendants had a legal obligation to release or correct
the document within twenty (20) days or suffer the penalty. The statute allows for a
reasonable period of time to reconsider the actions taken and thus avoid any potential
liability. The Defendants know the Lis Pendens contained a material misstatement. It clearly
mischaracterized the nature of the proceedings being filed (or to be filed) and the nature of
the actual claim. (Addendum No. 21 at page 135).
The Plaintiff, on numerous dates through his attorney of record, W. Kevin Jackson,
has requested in writing that the Lis Pendens be released or, at the very minimum, provide
an explanation as to why it was recorded. (See Plaintiffs Exhibits 2 and 3). Throughout the
course of this case and until May of 1996, the Defendants had chosen to allow the false claim
to remain of record. Here again, this refusal to act is evidence of an intent to extort a
concession out of the Plaintiff which is wholly unrelated to any claim to the title or the right
to the physical possession to the home. No such claims have ever been asserted. (Abizaid
Aff ^ 9 tol 1). (Addendum No. 8 at page 30). The Lis Pendens was ordered released in
April and again on May of 1996, but notice of the release was not promptly sent to the
Plaintiff. This too is evidence of malice on the part of the Defendants. It is an attempt to
comply with the California Superior Court order to immediately release the Lis Pendens, but
retain the belief in the Plaintiffs mind that the title to the property is still clouded. UCA
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§38-9-4 provides that an action for damages can be filed in the District Court. The action for
damages can be joined with the quiet title action. The text of the statute reads as follows:
The owner or beneficial title-holder of the real property may bring an action
under this chapter in the district court of the county in which the real property
is located for such relief as is required to immediately clear title to the real
property or may join that action with an action for damages as described in this
chapter, after giving the notice required in Section 38-9-1. In either case, the
owner or beneficial title-holder may recover reasonable attorney fees and costs
of the action if he prevails.
This action was filed in December of 1995 by the Plaintiff in part to obtain an order
of the court releasing the Lis Pendens assert the statutory claims and to quite the title to the
property. The Plaintiff has already prevailed on a portion of his complaint due to the
California proceedings. (Addendum No. 17 at page 91). At the time the District Court ruled
on the summary judgment motion in March of 1998, the Lis Pendens had been released, but
that does not end the matter. The Plaintiff has other damages and is seeking the additional
relief that the statute specifically authorizes. This relief can include attorney's fees and any
proven special damages. Charles Gillmore v. Veigh Cummings 904 P.2d 703 (Utah App.
1995) (slander of title case awarding attorney's fees as special damages).
C.

The District Court Erred as a Matter of Law in Ruling that the Cloud of Title Claim
Brought bv the Plaintiff Under the Code. UCA §38-9-1 et. seq. was Moot.
The District Court erred when it ruled that the statutory claim of the Plaintiff was

moot. (OrderofDismissalatPage2). (Addendum No. 22 at page 184). The cause of action
accrues and the minimum statutory liability attaches when the Lis Pendens was not released
within the twenty (20) day period. While it is true that the Lis Pendens was released in May,
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1996, (one year after it was filed) that does not mean that the Plaintiff David Winters has not
suffered any damages or that statutory liability has been lost. The eventual release of the
false document may mitigate future damages, but it does eliminate accrued injury or liability.
1.

Subsequent Compliance with a Remedial Statute After its Violation does not
Make a Claim for the Penalty and Damages Moot.

The statute the Plaintiff is seeking relief under is a remedial provision which is
intended to prevent abuse of the legal system. It is to be broadly construed. It provides
statutory penalties and allows the recovery of any proven special damages. The special
damages that may eventually be proven are to be tripled. The Defendant Schulman cannot
reason that the claim against her is moot because the Lis Pendens has now been released.
Justice delayed is justice denied.
2.

The Statutory Claim of the Plaintiff is not Moot as the Result of the California
Court Issuance of a Restraining Order Against the Plaintiff from Disposing of
the Property.

The issuance of a restraining order against the Plaintiff does not make the Plaintiffs
statutory claim moot. The Plaintiff fully acknowledges that a family law court that has
acquired personal jurisdiction over the parties is authorized and often does issue a restraining
order as to property. However, a restraining order does not cloud the chain of title to any real
property. A restraining order of the type issued in the California case, simply prevents the
party from disposing of the property, or subjects the disobedient party to the contempt
powers of the court. This is clearly an authorized course of action. This is only one (1) of
several remedies that could have been asserted from the start of the case. John P. Dority v.
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Jean D. Dority 645 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982). A restraining order does not prevent a bona fide
purchaser from acquiring good title. Marvin W. Hansen v. Reuel S. Kohler 550 P.2d 186
(Utah 1976). This may have been a real "concern" of the Defendants. However, during all
of the years the case was smoldering, the Plaintiff never attempted to "flee justice" or to
"secret away" any assets, nor has any such conduct even been alleged by the Defendants.
This financial dispute between the former spouses was brewing for at least three (3) years.
(Schulman Aff. Exhibit "E", Pages 2 to 3). (Addendum No. 15 at page 87). These types of
disputes are fairly common and routine in family law matters.
The issuance of a restraining order does not moot the statutory claim. The eventual
settlement of the case does not moot the statutory claim. The Plaintiff would concede for
purposes of argument that the cause of action does not ripen if the document is released or
corrected within twenty (20) days.
The eventual grant of a Trust Deed on the property does not make the statutory claim
moot. There is a significant legal difference between a notice of "Lis Pendens" and a "Trust
Deed" of the type that is now recorded against the property pursuant to the settlement
agreement. A Notice of Lis Pendens creates an insecurity concerning the state of the title and
discloses the existence of possible competing interests to the property. A Lis Pendens
suggests to third parties that ownership of the asset is in question and they run a significant
risk of not getting good title to the property if it is purchased. A Trust Deed, on the other
hand, creates no such cloud on the state of the fee title. A Trust Deed merely represents a
specified claim for a sum of money which is secured by the property. The owner's legal title
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to the property is not open to question.
3.

The Statutory Claim is not Moot by the Release of the Defendant Allison
Abizaid.

Under current law, the release or dismissal of one party does not constitute a release
or compromise of any claim that the claimant may have against the other parties. The
provisions of UCA §78-27-42 reads as follows:
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does
not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides.
In this case, the domestic dispute between the former spouses has been fully settled.
It was never adjudicated by the court. (Schulman Aff Exhibit "H"). (Addendum No. 20 at
page 97). However, the settlement arrangement (as accepted and confirmed by the court)
expressly reserved the present claim against the Defendant, Joanne Schulman. (Addendum
No. 20 at page 100).
The Defendant Schulman's status of acting as the Defendant Abizaid's agent or
attorney does not insulate her from statutory liability thereby rendering the claim moot. The
statute allows an action to be taken against any person "who causes or has cased a document
asserting that claim to be recorded . . . . " UCA §38-9-1.
Ms. Schulman by her own admission stated that she "caused the Lis Pendens to be
recorded" on the Plaintiffs property. (Schulman Aff.1}6). Not only did the Defendant
Schulman cause the filing, but she suggested this specific course of conduct to her client
claiming it was in her client's best interest to do so. (Schulman Aff. 1fl|6 and 13; Abizaid Aff.
1J12). In addition, all requests to release the Lis Pendens were sent to the Defendant Joanne
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Schulman for the benefit of her client, Allison Abizaid. The statutory claims of the Plaintiff
are not moot.
4.

The Claim of "Mootness" has not been Plead in the Defendant's Answer.

The District Court should not have granted the Defendants' cross-motion for summary
judgment on the basis of "mootness." This defense should not have been considered by the
court. Rule 8(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "a party shall state in short
and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted...." Rule 8(c) further provides that all
claims "constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense" must be specifically stated in the
pleading.
Rule 12(b) provides that "every defense . . . shall be asserted in the responsive
pleadings thereto . . .". The rule allows certain enumerated defenses to be asserted by
motion. Mootness is not one of them. Under this rule, the Defendant Joanne Schulman must
set forth her asserted defenses in her answer including all reasons for avoiding any liability.
Judge Thorne granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss all of the complaint in large
part on the claim of "mootness." (Addendum No. 22, at page 183). This defense was not
raised in the answer of the Defendant, Joanne Schulman. (Addendum No. 9 at page 36).
Rule 12(b) specifically provides that a defense of this type can not be made by motion.
The defense of mootness has been waived by the Defendant pursuant to Rule 12(h).
Therefore, the mootness claim cannot be a basis for the District Court's decision.
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D.

The Trial Court Committed Error in Dismissing the Plaintiffs Claim of Negligence
for a Lack of Duty Owed by the Defendant Attorney.
The Plaintiffs complaint and his supporting affidavit present a prima facie case of

negligence. This is Count III of the Complaint.
The Defendant Joanne Schulman does owe a duty of care to the Plaintiff David
Winters. A person has a common law duty of care not to injure another by his or her
conduct, however well intended the actions may be. An attorney has a further duty of care
not to prepare and then use an improper legal instrument against any person. This duty is
contained in The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. A specific duty to act is also found
in UCA §38-9-1 st. seq. The Defendant Schulman has breached both of these duties.
1.

The Common Law Duty of the Defendant Schulman to the Plaintiff.

Every human being owes a duty of due care as regarding their personal conduct as it
relates to any other human being. Restatement Torts 2d §6; 74 Am.Jur.2d Torts §5. The
level of care that is owed and the specific types of duties each person has in relation to one
another can arise from a number of sources such as the common law, state and federal
statutes, and the professional rules and regulations of each state. There is no singular
definition of this duty.
Every person, under the common law, has a duty to not engage in a course of conduct
that he or she knows will injure another person or their property. 74 Am.Jur. 2d Torts §9 and
§11; UCA 68-3-1. Ms. Schulman, a knowledgeable lawyer, should have known and should
have appreciated the fact that damage can arise when a wrongful claim to real property is
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asserted by means of an unauthorized Lis Pendens especially where it contains material
misstatements as to the nature of the actual claim. The Defendant was put on actual notice
of this risk by the various letters sent to her. The statute allows a person ample time in which
to reconsider the appropriateness of the recorded document and withdraw it or correct it.
Yet, Ms. Schulman proceeded in a course of conduct that has done some economic damage
to the Plaintiff. (Addendum No. 12 at page 67). She continued in this course of conduct
over a long period of time even after she was apprized of the wrongfulness of the filing. The
affirmative duty to release the Lis Pendens is set forth in the statute. When the duty to
release the document was made known to her, she did nothing. She had the ability to release
the recorded claim but she did not want to do so, because there were other objectives to be
achieved.
2.

The Professional Duty of the Defendant Schulman to the Plaintiff.

The Defendant Joanne Schulman (as a lawyer) has a professional duty that is owed
directly to the Plaintiff David Winters. The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct set forth
such a duty.

Section Four (4) deals with the duty of lawyers having transactions with

persons other than their own clients. Rule 4.4 reads as follows:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use
methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.
[Emphasis Added.]
The comment to Rule 4.4 adds that "a lawyer may [not] disregard the rights of third
persons." David Winters is entitled to at least due process of law before his assets are seized,
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liened, or taken for the nonpayment of a debt.
Ms. Schulman, in this case, used an improper means to accomplish an economic
objective for her client. Ms. Schulman prepared and then recorded an unauthorized Notice
of Lis Pendens in complete disregard to the Plaintiffs rights to due process of law. The Lis
Pendens was not statutorily authorized under Utah law and was not judicially recognized by
the California Superior Court. The recording of the Lis Pendens was the functional
equivalent of using "distraint11 over the real property. Black's Law Dictionary 4th Edition
defines distrain as taking "a pledge property of another, and keep it until the property is
replevied by the sheriff." Distraint was used at common law to compel the performance of
a promise or the payment of a debt.
The actions of the Defendants were intended to place a "cloud" on the Plaintiffs chain
of title until her client could obtain a money judgment or other form ofjudicial relief against
the Plaintiff. (Schulman Aff. Tfl}4 to 6). This type of legal representation is not allowed by
Rule 4.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Whether she deliberately or by
mistaken belief acted in this way, the Defendant Schulman violated her ethical and her
professional duty to the Plaintiff David Winters. The law on the proper content and the
proper use of a Notice of Lis Pendens is not in doubt in the State of Utah.
The Defendant Schulman has a legal duty not to injure a third party (i.e. "burden a
third person") by the recording of a Lis Pendens under the facts of this case. When title to
an asset is clouded, it naturally creates embarrassment and emotional anger. Ms. Schulman
had a statutory duty to release the claim once this matter was brought to her personal
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attention. The Defendant also had a professional duty not to disregard the rights of others
in the course of representing her own client. All of these duties were owed to the Plaintiff,
David Winters, by the Ms. Schulman and all of them were breached. The trial court
mistakenly ignored these duties and ruled that the Defendant Schulman had no duty of care.
The claim of negligence brought by the Plaintiff in his complaint is not the traditional
attorney-client malpractice claim, but rather the breach of an ethical and legal duty owed to
third parties under the common law, under the state statute requiring the release of the Lis
Pendens, and based upon the duty contained in the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
E.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment Dismissing the Plaintiffs
Claim of Abuse of Process.
The abuse of process tort claim as set forth in the complaint of Plaintiff meets the

common law elements. Even if it is argued that one of the elements was lacking when the
case was initially filed, the trial court erred in not allowing a proper extension of the tort or
finding that elements were in fact satisfied when the motions were heard in March of 1998.
Abuse of process and malicious prosecution is the use of a legal process "primarily
to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed for." America Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carl
Schettler 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989). This is such a case.
The preparation and the eventual recording of an unauthorized Lis Pendens containing
a material misstatement is an abuse of legal process when it is used for a purpose other than
what the law allows or intends. The Defendant Schulman has acknowledged that she used
the Lis Pendens as a stop-gap measure until she could obtain some other form of judicial
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relief (Schulman Aff.ffl[3to 6). (Addendum No. 21 at pages 106 to 107). This was done
even though the financial dispute between the former spouses was years in the making.
During this lengthy period of time, there was no "flight" or "hiding of assets" by David
Winters.
A common law claim for abuse of legal process requires proof of four (4) elements.
1.

That the process be brought for the purpose of harassment or annoyance;

2.

The process was used without probable cause;

3.

The process was done with malice; and

4.

The Plaintiff must be a successful Defendant in a prior action. Maurine C.
Baird v. Intermountain School Fed. Credit Union 555 P.2d 877 (Utah 1976).

The first element has been met. The preparation and the filing of the Lis Pendens was
wrongful. It was done to harass and to annoy. It was recorded in order to gain an leverage
in any settlement negotiations. The Lis Pendens was recorded in order to prevent the
Plaintiff from using the property for any purpose until the Ms. Schulman's client could
obtain a money judgment. There was never a claim made that the home's value was less then
the gross amount of the claim as originally asserted by Ms. Abizaid. (Addendum No. 8 at
page 30, asserting $62,000.00 claim). The Lis Pendens was used despite the fact that at no
time (after the date the quit claim deed was signed) did Ms. Abizaid ever claim she owned
a specific interest in the home. (Abizaid Aff ffl[9 to 11).
The second element has also been met. The controlling statutes authorizing the use
of a Lis Pendens were not complied with. Never was there a claim to title or physical
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possession of the property made in any court at any time. (Addendum No. 8 at page 32). No
immediate civil suit was commenced on which the Lis Pendens could rest. Marvin W.
Hansen v. Reuel S. Kohler 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976).
The third element has also been met. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a filing
of a Lis Pendens as part of the collection of an unsecured debt is done in bad faith and with
malice. Max E. Birch v. Forest W. Fuller 9 Ut.2d 79, 337 P.2d 964 (Utah 1959). What
makes this present case particularly wrongful, is that the Ms. Schulman did not even attach
the required California mailing certificate to the Lis Pendens. She did not immediately notify
the Plaintiff of the recording of the document. This is more evidence of the malice.
The preamble of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct found in the Rules of
Professional Conduct sets out a duty of the lawyer not to abuse legal process. The paragraph
reads as follows:
A Lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in
professional service to clients and in the Lawyer's business and personal
affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes
and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect
for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers
and other public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to
challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyers's duty to uphold
legal process. [Emphasis Added.]
The fourth element has been met. There was another action undertaken concerning
the Lis Pendens. In that other action, the Plaintiff has been a successful party. That action
was the divorce enforcement motion filed in the state of California. The California Superior
Court ordered the release of the Lis Pendens. (Schulman Aff. Exhibit MGff, reflecting the
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court's minutes of 4-19-96 hearing). (Addendum No. 16 to 18 at pages 90 to 94). The
Superior Court was twice required to order the Lis Pendens released. The Plaintiffs divorce
lawyer filed a separate motion asking the California Superior Court to order the release of
the Notice of Lis Pendens. (Addendum No. 24 at page 191). This relief was eventually
granted in April and again in May of 1996. (Abizaid Aff. 1flf 19 and 20). Since the California
Superior Court ordered the Defendant Abizaid to release the Lis Pendens, the divorce
enforcement action should be considered an action in which the Plaintiff was a successful
party (i.e. getting the court to order the release of the Lis Pendens).
California law has long recognized the civil liability of a lawyer to a third party when
the lawyer participates in the wrongful acts of his client. See 7 Cal.Jur.3d (Rev.), Attorneys
at Law §350. In situations based on fraud or on a malicious or tortuous act, an attorney who
participates in the wrongful acts of his client may, in addition to any disciplinary
responsibility, be held civilly liable to the injured third party.

Warner v. Roadshow

Attractions Co. 56 Cal.2d 1, 132 P.2d 35 (1942) (The Defendant company and certain of its
attorneys illegally interfered with the distribution of the Plaintiff motion pictures.).
The abuse of process claim was sufficient to withstand a summary judgment of
dismissal. The District Court erred in dismissing the abuse of process claim.
F.

Should the District Court Have Granted the Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment
as to Statutory Liability Under the Provisions of UCA §38-9-1 et.seq?
The District Court erred in denying the Plaintiffs motion for partial summary

judgment, at least as to the violation of the provisions of UCA §38-9-1 et.seq. As stated
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above, the Defendant Schulman did prepare and cause the Notice of Lis Pendens to be filed.
(Schulman Aff. ^}3 to 5; Abizaid Aff. ^12). The Notice of Lis Pendens did contain a false
claim (or at the very least a material misstatement) as to the nature of the claim. The
pleadings that were eventually filed in October of 1995 sought the entry of a money
judgment. (Schulman Aff. Exhibit "A"). (Addendum No. 8 at page 30). The recording of
the wrongful Notice of Lis Pendens under the facts of this case are not covered by a claim
of an absolute or even a qualified privilege. The defense of privilege was not raised in the
Answer and should not have been considered by the District Court.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment as to the violation of UCA §389-1 et. seq. should have been granted by the District Court. The Plaintiffs claim should be
remanded for a trial to determine the Plaintiffs actual and special damages. UCA §38-9-1
et.seq.
The Plaintiff has plead and established a prima facie case of abuse of legal process
under the facts of the case. This common law claim should be remanded to the District Court
for trial.
The Plaintiff has plead and established the prima facie case of negligence on the part
of Ms. Schulman. She owes a duty of care to the Plaintiff. This affirmative duty of care
arises from several sources. This common law claim should be remanded to the District
Court for trial.
The fact that the divorced parties settled their domestic law dispute does not "moot"
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the Plaintiffs claims. In addition, the issuance of a personal restraining order against the
Plaintiff does not "moot" his statutory cause of action. The Defendants' claim of privilege
and mootness are not raised in the Defendants' answer and cannot be the legal basis for the
court's decision. The District Court's ruling should be reversed.
The Defendant's claim of privilege is based on a disputed fact and cannot in any event
be determined as a complete defense when it is asserted for the first time in a motion for
summary judgment.
Respectfully submitted.
DATED this 7th day of October, 1998.

W ^ ^ y i n /Jackson
Attorney at Law
/
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